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Abstract
In a growing market world-economy, in which the scope for financial mismanagement
increases, enterprises need to strengthen their strategic risk management. Enterprise
governance is not only a publicly regulated issue but also a matter of self-control, since
it is closely related to conformance and performance (value creation). Therefore, enterprise
governance should be studied from the viewpoint of proactive and preventive (feed
forward) control rather than a reactive and reflective (feedback) viewpoint. The integrated
aspects of financial and management accounting should be examined with relation to
internal control and enterprise governance, although generally only corporate governance
(conformance) has been discussed from the viewpoints of auditing and financial accounting,
and feedback control. Management accountants in Japan should pay more attention to
the establishment of feed forward management accounting and good enterprise
governance.
Keywords: Internal control, enterprise governance, value creation, risk management
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the role and function of contemporary
management accounting and the management accountant in relation to enterprise
governance, in the sense proposed by the Professional Accountants in Business
Committee (PAIB) of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) (PAIB,
2004; Connell, 2004). The paper also relates enterprise governance to management
accounting through the concept of feed forward control.
Enterprise governance integrates conformance or corporate governance with
performance or business governance. Corporate governance includes the
protection of stakeholders from unfair and fraudulent behavior by management.
Business governance, which seeks to securely create value and attain strategic
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goals, ensures good corporate governance. However, it cannot be dissociated
from conformance. Conformance and performance depends upon the social and
economic behavior of management. This matter is discussed from the viewpoint
of a globally changing management environment.
The management environment has become more unstable and uncertain in the
presence of greater competition and as a result of developments in information
technology and communication. Crises can quickly arise, even in previously
profitable enterprises, either caused by or causing poor governance practices. As
a result, the social responsibility of directors and management to stakeholders has
become a focus of attention. Enhanced disclosure, accountability and auditing
standards have been widely canvassed issues in relation to corporate governance.
However, little discussion of the role of management accounting and the
management accountant in enterprise governance has taken place in this context.
In what follows, I first sketch the international development of corporate
governance and its structural characteristics in different countries. Second, I
review the relationship between business failure and corporate governance in
Japan after 1990. Third, the importance of risk management, especially internal
control, to business governance is discussed. Fourth, I address the meanings of
feed forward control in the context of enterprise governance. In the conclusion, I
advocate more disclosure of information on strategy and risk, based upon the
viewpoint of feed forward control.
Institutional and Capital Structural Aspects of Corporate
Governance
A spate of recent scandals such as WorldCom and Enron illustrate how unethical
practices involved in the use and disclosure of accounting information can defraud
the stakeholders of enterprises, including employees, creditors and the government
and shareholders (Stuart and Stuart, 2004). It is evident in such cases that oversight
procedures adopted by Boards of Directors are often inadequate, that chief
executives and senior managers are capable of dishonest behavior, auditors are
often not independent and collusion between various parties can occur. This
experience has lead to institutional reforms in corporate governance.
Tables 1 and 2, summarize some of the measures that have been taken by Western
and Asian nations respectively in dealing with legal issues in corporate governance.
In the West, countries mainly tackle internal control problems, in which matters
of governance such as the independence of directors, independent oversight
procedures, internal auditing and disclosure and accountability practices are legally
enhanced. Internal control is increasingly integrated with the broader concept of
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European Union *A High level Group of Company *A modern regulatory
Law Expert (November 2002) framework for company law
in Europe
** An Action Plan (May 2003) **Modernizing company law
 and enhancing corporate
governance in the European
Union - a plan to move forward
***Federation des Experts ***A discussion paper: The
Comptables Europeens financial reporting and auditing
(September 2003) experts of corporate governance
International *A Task Force on Rebuilding *Rebuilding public confidence
Federation of Confidence in Financial Reporting in financial reporting: An
Accountants (July 2003) international perspective
Organization for *The OECD Principles of
Economic Corporate Governance (1999)
Cooperation and **The Revised Draft Principles
Development (January 2004)
Australia (MM) *Corporate Governance Council; *Principles of good corporate
The Australian Stock Exchange governance and best practice
recommendation (March 2003)
**Corporate Law Economic **(Audit reform, corporate
Reform Program: 9 Bill disclosure and executive
(July 2004) remuneration and the outcome
and consultation
Canada (MM) The Joint Committee on Corporate Beyond compliance: building a
Governance (the Saucier governance culture (November
Committee) 2001)
France (RM) *Vienet Report (1995 and 1999)
**Bouton Report (2002)
**Combined report of the three ***The corporate governance of
reports  (October 2003) listed corporations
Italy (RM) *The Preda Report (October 1999) *Under the sponsorship of the
**Its Revised version (July 2002) Italian Stock Exchange
Netherlands *The Dutch Code of the Best *The 40 recommendations of
(RM) Practice (2003) the Peters report
**The Tabaksblat Committee  **The two-tier board structure
(December 2003) (management and supervisory
board)
United Kingdom *Cadbury Report (1992)
(MM) **Combined Code on Corporate
Governance (1998)
***A Revised Combined Code
(July 2003)
United States *Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002)
(MM) **Breeden Report on the Future
Corporate Governance of MC
(formerly World Com) (August 2003)
International organization, Requirement of law and Comment
Nation, and Area Regulation
Table 1: The Requirement of Corporate Governance Law and Regulation in the West
* (MM) Shows the Market Model, While (RM) the Relationship Model
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Nation and area Requirement Content
China Ministry of Finance: Standards Enhancing internal checking
of Internal Accounting Control: system
Fundamental Standard, and Money
Funds, for Trail Implementation
(Jun 2001)
Hong Kong The Standing Committee on Concerning corporate governance
Company Law Reform (June 2003) reform
Japan (RM) *Amendment of Auditing *Enhancing internal control and
Standard (January 2002) risk approach
** Ministry of Economy and **Guidelines for internal control
Industry: Internal Control functioned together with risk
in the New Risky Age (June 2003) management
***Amendment of Commercial ***Enhancing corporate
Code (from 2001 to 2002) governance
Korea (M) Committee on Corporate
Governance: Code of Best Practice
for Corporate Governance
Malaysia (HM) Financial Committee on Corporate
Governance: Code on Corporate
Governance (March 2000)
Singapore *Amendment to the Companies
Act (July 2002)
**The Council on Corporate Disclosure **To review and enhance the
and Governance (August 2002): existing framework on corporate
Corporate Governance and Disclosure governance and promote good
Requirements corporate governance in
Singapore, taking into account
international best practices
Thailand (HM) The Stock Exchange of Thailand
*The SET Code of Best Practice for
Directions of Listed Companies
(Corporate Disclosure Standards)
19 January 1998
**Best Practice Guidelines for
Audit Committee 23 June 1999
***Regulations of the Stock
Exchange, 22 January 2001
Taiwan *Amendment of the Corporate
Law (November 2001)
**Corporate Governance Best-Practice
Principles for the Taiwan Stock
Exchange Corporation and GreTai
Securities Market Jointly
(October 2002)
Table 2: Requirement of Corporate Governance Law and Regulation in Asia
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risk management. International organizations such as OECD and IFAC play an
important role in building legal and institutional systems for good corporate
governance.
A common feature in Asian countries is that legal changes in corporate governance
are associated with the inflow of capital from Western countries and their economic
influences.  Consequently, many countries follow the example of American and
English codes and requirements. For example, Japan followed the American
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadyway Commission’s (COSO)
Internal Control-Integrated Framework to establish oversight management
and remuneration committees and to appoint independent, non-executive directors
to Boards of Directors to improve corporate governance (The Society for the
Study of Risk Management and Internal Control, 2003). Similar influences can be
seen in Korea, Malaysia, and elsewhere. Legal and institutional interference with
the processes of the corporate governance is a consequence of the international
change in the business environment and of widespread distrust with the
management of large multinational enterprises. The present situation has parallels
with that of the 1930s.
Capital-market structure is considered important in determining the strength of
corporate governance. There are two main models of corporate governance,
which reflect cultural and capital-structure differences: the capital market or
‘neo-classical’ model (Banks, 2004; Dietl, 1998) and the relationship model. The
neo-classical model focuses on the strengths of competition, forcing transparency
and independent auditors on capital markets. The relationship model focuses on
the enhancement of corporate governance through the close-relationship of
enterprises with governments, banks, workers and other interested parties. As
indicated Table 1 and Table 2, the former is Anglo-American while the latter is
Continental European in origin.
Many Asian countries follow a hybrid of the two models. The Anglo-American
type provides openness and the application of the agency principle reduces
dependence on bureaucracy. Close relationships between banks, companies and
other organizations, in contrast, have also been considered to provide advantages
in good corporate governance in Japan because they encourage long-term stability.
Both types of regime have been found wanting in recent times, however. The
Enron and WorldCom scandals in the US have brought into question the
effectiveness of the neo-classical model. The changed global political and economic
circumstances that weakened banking sector in Japan have reduced the
effectiveness of its network of governance and many Japanese companies have
failed.
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Germany originated a representative type of the relationship model, still followed
by many Japanese enterprises. Under this approach, it is the function of a
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) to represent social interests made up of
shareholders and workplace representatives (Niyama, 2001; Itami, 2000).
However, this has also not prevented ‘corporate scandals and other problems
arising’ (Appleyard and Pallet, 2004). Evidently, application of neither the market
nor relationship model can guarantee a solution to the problems besetting corporate
governance.
Management self-interest and arrogance is a feature of unfair and fraudulent
practices in corporate governance. Another feature, not so frequently noted, is
that, failures of corporate governance are closely related to weak and unchecked
strategies and risk management.  Without good business governance good
enterprise governance cannot be achieved in an unstable and rapidly changing
world economy. Legal requirements and structural models only touch upon the
apparent adjustment issues arising between management and stakeholders and
cannot alone solve the fundamental problems of enterprise governance. Successful
corporate governance fundamentally originates from the implementation of
successful strategy and risk management. Enterprises must now shift their
standpoint from avoiding risks to managing them, ‘since risk is essential for growth’
(Prickett, 2004).
These problems are more difficult to overcome in Asia than the West. In most
Asian countries, few top managers are comfortable with the ‘philosophy of
corporate governance’. Furthermore, their understanding of the principles of
corporate governance is weak, since the separation between ownership and
management, or between the directors and chief manager, is less pronounced
than in western countries. It is common for the chairman of an enterprise to be
closely connected with the owners and managers of the same enterprise through
family relationships. Also, auditors and directors are not appointed independently
(Solomon and Solomon, 2004; Kim, 1995).
Bankruptcy and Corporate Governance in Japan
I now examine the structural roots of unfair and fraudulent behavior by
management. This analysis is illustrated by Japanese cases. Effective corporate
governance is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the sustainable creation
of business value in the long run. Structural changes in the economic and business
environment are responsible for the present, imperfect systems of governance.
Therefore, effective enterprise governance systems must recognize such structural
change and provide strategic countermeasures to deal with its impact. The current
Japanese experience serves as an example of this principle.
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Table 3: One Hundred Large-Scale Bankruptcies in Japan After the Second
World War: Its Trend
(Money unit = million yen)
Period Number of Average liabilities
company per bankrupted company
1975 1 150,000
The 1980s 4 286,400
The 1990s 70 394,021
The 2000s 25 642,963
(Until January 2001)
Table 3, in chronological order, shows the average liabilities per company of the
top 100 large-scale bankruptcies in Japan since 1990. After the collapse of the
bubble economy, both the number of bankruptcies and the amount of liabilities per
company continued to increase over the next ten years, decreasing slightly in
2003. Profitable enterprises continue to face risks in the aftermath of these failures.
The industrial sectors that most strongly impact upon the prosperity of others in
this respect are banking, securitized loans, resort development, hotel, and golf
course management (see Table 4). Their average ratio of liabilities to capital
stock per company is higher than other sectors. There is no complete means for
ensuring the safety of creditors. The buffer to defend stakeholder from risks
becomes much smaller in the presence of bank and insurance company failures.
Life insurance and construction companies, although their average liabilities to
capital stock are less than the above sectors, have also had a strong influence on
other sectors in the aftermath of the period of firm failures. Although average
liabilities per company and the ratio of liabilities to capital stock in the manufacturing
sector are the lowest of all the sectors, this sector is also still threatened by the
earlier series of bankruptcies.
The data in Table 4 shows the high ratio of liabilities to capital stock among failed
companies in a number of sectors. Enterprises with high liability profiles provoke
unease among the business community. From Table 5, the ratio of liabilities to
capital stock was 7794.8 million yen in bankrupt companies with 10 to 50 million
yen of capital stock. This pattern continues at present, though somewhat diminished.
In 2003 the number of bankrupted companies was 16,624 with liabilities of 11.78
billion yen, down about 14% in comparison with the previous year’s figures of
19,458 and 13.8 billion yen, respectively.
Under these circumstances, what does the accounting concept of capital stock
mean? According to Marple (1936) the funds contributed by the stockholders are
a buffer giving a margin of safety to creditors. However, the function of capital
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stock as ‘a buffer for the creditors’, common in many code-law countries of Asia
following the Continental European tradition, appears to have diminished. Capital
stock has been transformed to a concept that does not take into account the
effect of feedback control on creditors’ protection.
(Money unit = Million yen)
Industry Average liabilities per Ratio of liabilities to
(Number of company) bankrupted company capital stock
Life insurance (3) 2,815,497 48.6
Banking, lease, n and securities 395,523 983.8
business (44)
Real estate dealer (26) 262,739 4093.4
Department store and supermarket (6) 347,247 1317
General merchant and trading 446,263 17.2
company (2)
Construction (6) 939,799 141.7
Shipping agent and transportation (2) 342,150 58.6
Venture capital (1) 500,000 113.6
Resort development, Hotel, and Golf 240,802 1078.5
course management (7)
Manufacturing (2) 177,839 42.3
Table 4: Average Liabilities per Bankrupted Company and the Ratio of Liabilities to
Capital Stock by Industry
(Money unit = Million yen)
Capital size Average liabilities per Average liabilities to capital
(Number of company) bankrupted company stock of the company
L.10 – 50 (11) 190,628.7 7794.8
K.60 – 90 (8) 315,950 4119.2
J.100 (10) 264,320 2643.2
I.160 – 400 (10) 216,871 889.5
H.460 – 587 (11) 284,048 554.6
G.610 – 900 (3) 258,180 377.4
F.1000 – 1565 (7) 334,965 268.8
E.2000 – 2816 (8) 477,190 200
D.3112 – 6916 (13) 345,215 72.1
C.11787 – 17680 (9) 827,779 57.5
B.20262 – 39763 (6) 866,884 53.1
A.57598 – 85000 (3) 2,662,098 40.3
Table 5: Average Liabilities per Bankrupted Company and the Ratio of Liabilities to
Capital Stock by Capital Size in One Hundred Large-Scale Bankruptcies
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Imperfect corporate governance has obscured facts about the business
environment.  Risky business practices have been stimulated with ‘a check-free
empire’ of corporate management in Japan, since management is not accountable
to the board in any useful sense (Mochizuki, 1995). The received view that
Japanese business has a long-term stable perspective in its approach to investment
has contributed to ignorance regarding the need for management accountability.
All enterprises should take precautions not only to protect their own business
from risks, but also to positively manage the risks caused by supply chains, buyers,
and suppliers of finance. Risk repercussions on enterprises, including the
manufacturing sector, from the increasing interconnectedness of business in the
information economy, is a new challenge for enterprise governance. Therefore,
for sustainable success in business, management must embrace a strategic focus
and implement risk management, in addition to institutionally and structurally
established corporate governance.
Risk Management and Business Governance
In Japan many enterprises have lost public confidence due to unfair or fraudulent
practices since the early 1990s. Window dressing, through misleading disclosure
practices, has exacerbated the social and financial consequences of bankruptcy.
A corporate culture in which chief executives make arbitrary or self-interested
decisions and ignore the inconvenient recommendations of independent managers
continues to be a barrier to reform. For example, in the large supermarket chain
Daiei Inc., the chairman failed to change his firm’s unsuccessful strategies due to
the placing of too much importance on family management interests and to the
giving of insufficient weight to independent advice from professional subordinates
(Imoto, 1999).
 
Trend  of average liab ili ties to  capital  stock  by capita l size
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
A B C D E F G H I G K L
capital size
av
er
ag
e 
li
ab
ili
tie
s
Liabilit ies to  cap ital
stock
Figure 1: Trend of Average Liabilities to Capital Stock by Size
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Poor business governance practices can occur at any level of an organization and
negatively impact on public confidence. In the Yukizirushi (Snow Brand) Dairy
Manufacturing Company, the top producer of dairy products in Japan, senior
managers were unaware of low quality control standards that caused basic hygiene
in cleaning equipment to be compromised, inevitably leading to consumer anger
when the matter entered the public domain (Special Article, 2000). When
bureaucratic governance procedures in the Mitsubishi Motor Corporation
concealed consumer complaints of vehicle defects, its profit sharply dipped as a
result of lost social confidence. According to one shop manager, ‘During peak
times, about 20 customers would visit the shop each day, but since last scandal,
the number has dropped to two’ (Japan Times, 22 August 2004). These examples
show that large companies, which neglect good business governance, perhaps in
the pursuit of short term financial gain, run the risk of negatively impacting their
longer term interests.
In Japan, as elsewhere, internal control in the 1950s was defined as an internal
check system. It was viewed as a means to preserve company assets, secure the
accuracy and reliability of accounting data, and facilitate business efficiency and
effectiveness. Internal control is now more closely related to corporate governance.
The relationship between internal control and governance, however, now needs
to be examined from the viewpoint of strategy and business governance, i.e.
value creation and performance.
Most failures of business in Japan in the 1990s were connected with deficiencies
in strategy and risk management. The immaturity of strategy management, senior
managers’ desire to expand their businesses, without consideration to changes in
the global economic environment, led to accounting manipulation, window-dressing
and unfair and fraudulent behavior. Poor corporate governance practices, involving
secrecy, rule-braking and criminal activity, accelerated imprudent strategic
management and the acceptance of risky or low rate of return projects. It is
evident that bad enterprise governance results from defective strategy and business
risk control. The basic principle of finance, that risk has to be balanced against
return is forgotten or ignored.
Therefore, a company that devotes itself only to corporate governance, particularly
the conformance to the requirements of law and regulation, overlooking the need
for good business governance with respect to strategy and risk management, will
likely fail to achieve its objectives in the long run. In a competitive and rapidly
changing economic environment, sound business governance is necessary for
sustainable business growth. The view that this argument supports the position
that ‘good corporate governance is a necessary, but not sufficient, foundation for
success’ (PAIB, 2004, p. 5) is becoming more widely accepted. As COSO states
‘while internal control can help an entity achieve its objectives, it is not a panacea.’
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Financial and management accounting have the same origins, since disclosure
cannot realize accountability without controllability (Nishimura, 2003). Disclosure
without controllability is an empty ceremony (Nishimura, 2003, Preface). To
integrate social confidence with the sustainable creation of value, disclosure with
controllability based on accountability is required. Corporate governance without
business governance is only a formal compromise between management and
stakeholders. It must tie up with the oversight of value creation activities to
management. The idea that ‘enterprise governance’ referred to in this paper is a
possible solution to current problems in corporate governance, originates in an
idea proposed by the PAIB.
Enterprise governance is a comprehensive term encompassing corporate
governance, conformance, and business governance and value creation (PAIB,
2004, p.10). Corporate governance is related to accountability and assurance,
while business governance is related to value creation and resource utilization.
The PAIB (2003) summarized the relationships of the two governances as follows:
‘enterprise governance is an emerging term, which describes a framework
covering both the corporate and the business governances of an organization.
Achieving a panacea of good corporate governance that is linked strategically
with performance management will enable companies to focus on the key drivers
that move their business forward. This is both a challenge and an opportunity’.
The distinguishing feature of business governance is its assessment of risk from
the two angles of internal control and strategic management. A Strategic
Scorecard, but not the Balanced Scorecard, fills the strategic oversight gap.
The Strategic Scorecard is not a planning tool, but it is an oversight tool, to help
the board of directors grasp all aspects of the strategic process. It is made up of
four basic elements: strategic position, strategic options, strategic implementation,
and strategic risks. By using the scorecard, the governing board of an enterprise
can identify the key points in, and timing of, effective strategic decision-making
and recognize ‘milestones in strategic implementation together with the identification
and mitigation of strategic risk’ (PAIB, 2004, p. 6). Such a scorecard thus attaches
importance to filling the strategic oversight gap in transformational changes such
as mergers, acquisitions and bankruptcies, which the Balanced Scorecard does
not address (PAIB, p.24). While the Balanced Scorecard is operational and reactive
with respect to a given strategy, the Strategic Scorecard fulfills its function with
respect to transformation and abrupt change. Prickett (2004, p.15) argues that
the Strategic Scorecard forces boards to consider where the company is now,
what its options are, and how it will manage risks.
I believe that the Strategic Scorecard is founded on the recognition of the need
for feed-forward control. The conceptual distinction between feedback and feed-
forward control is described in Table 6. Generally, feedback control begins where
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feed-forward control ends. Feedback control must correct the imperfect
achievement of goals that feed-forward cannot realize. In this case, the imperfect
feed-forward is only the forecast part of feedback control. However, by nature,
feedback control is not necessary for perfect feed-forward control.  Theoretically
and practically, both concepts are independent. Feed-forward control is critical to
effective enterprise governance and the implementation of a Strategic Scorecard,
not because of the necessity to forecast and estimate, but because it supports the
realization of the goal of sustainable progress through proactive and preventive
control of enterprise resources. In contrast, feedback control is reactive and
reflective and does not serve the needs of a Strategic Scorecard.
Enterprise Governance and Feed Forward Control
Contemporary enterprises in a world afflicted by scandals are usually large,
composed of thousands of employees whose activities are diverse and complex.
Individuals in such enterprises deal with issues of strategy and risk on a daily
basis. The corporate culture of obedience to a chief executive’s directions is not
well suited to the challenges of sustainable growth and best corporate governance
(Special Report, 2003). Risk management is proactively and preventively
implemented only where all individuals are conscious of strategy and risks.
Most advocates of corporate governance tend to fill oversight gaps in the
constitution of boards and auditing committees by suggesting the enlargement of
the feedback functions of accountability, disclosure, and internal control. However,
in order to root out the causes of unfair and fraudulent behavior, senior managers
should not only strengthen the accountability and disclosure of the implementation
process of strategy and risk management, but also assess strategy and its related
risks as accurately as possible by collecting environmental information, preventively
and proactively. In the case of operational risk, a proactive and preventive approach
depends upon networking with suppliers-chains through electronic communication
Control Planned Object of Assessor Effective Result
system value sensor device
Feedback Absolute truth Actual action Variance Reflective, Actual
between reactive performance
plan and control close to plan
actual action in next period
Feed forward Relative truth Virtual action Variance Proactive, Actual
between plan preventive performance
and virtual control close to plan
action at present
Table 6: Feedback and Feed Forward Controls in Management Accounting
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and quick transportation systems (Collier and Berry, 2002). The manner in which
the Strategic Scorecard could be used as part of feed forward control and connected
with accountability and disclosure processes is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Enterprise Governance and Feed Forward Control
All the risks of an enterprise cannot be disclosed. Only the assessment and proactive control of
the risks related to the selected strategies are illustrated in the report. The report is composed of
the progress of strategy and its prospect, the possibility of risks related to it and the preventive
actions to make them minimum, and the present situation of the strategy and risks.
Stakeholder
Management control and
risk management report 1
Strategic Scorecard (position.
option, implementation, risks)
Certificated Public Management Accountant
High transparency
The board of directors
Internal control
Feedforward and feedback control
Accountability is a basic requirement for large enterprises to be socially tolerated.
Disclosure and controllability would be pointless in present day society without
accountability.  Contemporary enterprises should therefore integrate accountability
with disclosure and controllability. The three basic elements of enterprise
governance should be based on feed-forward and feedback control systems.
Strategic management is often transformational and unstable because it confronts
the risks of such events as mergers and acquisitions.  However, risk-taking provides
opportunities for profit. In a competitive and changing world economy, enterprises
must take unavoidable risks in order to pursue a sustainable value-creative strategy.
Furthermore, large enterprises have to be proactively sensitive to environmental
protection and preservation interests, since their size makes it impractical to
reactively and reflectively control the potentially harmful wider impact of their
activities. As roundtable discussion participants pointed out in the Journal of
Strategy + business (2003),
‘the day of Charisma is over, challenging uncertainty by which growth
opportunity is created becomes more and more important, and faith must be
integrated with information and certainty’.
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Khurana (Special Report, 2004, p. 57) notes that trust takes a long time to build
but can be lost overnight. Many Japanese bankruptcies among large businesses
originate in distrust. Due to self-interest, arrogance and ignorance, senior managers
continue to disregard the views of junior management and employees, thereby
losing social trust.
Management accounting should emphasis the need for feed-forward control, linking
this with enterprise governance and performance. Risk management is sometimes
claimed to be essentially proactive and strategy a ‘living thing’ (Prickett, 2004,
pp. 14-5.). Japanese enterprises have historically succeeded in penetrating
international markets with goods of high quality and low cost. I have argued
elsewhere that part of this success is due to the adoption of feed-forward control
systems (Nishimura, 2003). Feed forward control has contributed to Japanese
strategic management but it now needs to be integrated with risk management.
The role of feed-forward control is not only the forecast of risks, but also to
assess risks as objectively as possible, through collecting business environment
information, using preventive and proactive methods to alter the risks associated
with strategic goals and to achieve planned goals. Feedback control is insufficient
for such a realization.
Senior management are responsible for the processes of feed forward and
feedback control but it is also necessary for these to be reported to the board of
directors and stakeholders to attain effective governance. Accountability is closely
connected to information on feed-forward and feedback controls. The board or
independent committee should review and check the process of feed-forward
control: assessing risks and checking management control.  Accountability depends
upon information about the processes of feedback and feed-forward controls
(see Figure 3). Good enterprise governance is built by the integration of
accountability, disclosure and controllability from the viewpoints of both feed-
forward and feedback controls. The oversight gap and the value creation under
risky business environment must be resolved on the basis of feed forward control
and information.
A question pertaining to the relationship between business governance and feed
forward control is: “Who can assess risks and check managers’ strategy-
implementation process and risk management from the viewpoint of feed forward
control?” This question is related to a generic reporting problem. When lay persons
are given information relating to feed-forward control by management it cannot
be readily interpreted and checked. Therefore, internal professional accountants
and, in particular, certificated public management accountants (CPMA), need to
play the same role in auditing management control process as external public
accountants do in the financial accounting arena. Proper disclosure and
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accountability practices relating to management control processes should be
assessed and checked by CPMAs or their equivalents. In countries such as Japan
where the management accounting profession is as yet relatively undeveloped
this calls for reforms of the education system and the establishment of a system
of qualification and certification for public management accountant.
The board of directors is ultimately responsible for business strategy. Therefore,
with the support of public management accountants and oversight committees,
the board should review the process of strategy implementation by the chief
executive and senior managers as well as make strategy (PAIB, p. 12). Enterprise
governance would be enhanced if information on strategy and its related risks
were given to stakeholders in a management control report or a strategy and
risks report closely connected to Strategic Scorecard. Figure 2 illustrates the
suggested relationships between business governance and CPMA’s role. In the
Mitsubishi Trading Company today, data numerically grading projects and estimating
the market value of their related assets and the probability of bankruptcy and
failure are incorporated with every investment project risk management system
(Abe, et al, 2000). If these data were included in publicly accessible concise
management control reports, transparency and social confidence in enterprise
would be heightened.
Figure 3: Business Governance and Management Accounting
Controllability
Accountability (information on feedback and feed forward control)
Disclosure
Creditability
Corporate governance
Conformance
Enterprise governance
Business Governance
Performance
Value creation
Efficiency and effectiveness
Strategy management and risk management
Feed Forward controlFeedback control
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Conclusion
Financial reporting, based on international standards, is quite uniform in large
companies in most nations. Substantial resources have been invested in recent
years in improving the impact of financial reporting on effective corporate
governance. Management accounting reporting practices are, in contrast, widely
different between countries. Far fewer resources have been devoted to improving
enterprise governance by implementing better management accounting practices.
Consequently, more effort should be made to increase the role of management
accounting and management control systems in order to integrate corporate
governance with successful value creation or effective business governance.
The integration of financial reporting and management accounting information
which have long been advocated (e.g. Dressler, 2002; Kaplan, 1984) can also be
advanced from the viewpoint of good enterprise governance. Countries that have
underdeveloped certified public management accounting practices should examine
the role of professional management accounting bodies such as the CPMA in
relation to strategic risk management in order to establish good enterprise
governance. A feed forward approach to management control is central to this
process. To support these endeavors, the accounting education system must
integrate financial and managerial accounting systems.
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